Anti-defection law explained
Seven MPs, the two-thirds rule, and the case before the Supreme Court.
An account of the anti-defection law from the floor-crossings of 1967 to the Ninety-first Amendment; of the seven resignations of April 2026 and the merger claimed upon them; and of the question a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court will answer in December 2026, in the first defection case in decades that cannot be rendered moot: whether a two-thirds walkout escapes disqualification, and what, in the eyes of the Constitution, a merger is.
In the closing week of April 2026, a political party in India achieved a condition unknown to nature and, until recently, unknown to law. Within one chamber of Parliament, it stood merged into its principal rival. Everywhere beyond that chamber, it remained fully alive: registered with the Election Commission, in possession of its election symbol, administering a State government, and contesting the very party into which it had supposedly dissolved.
One party; two simultaneous realities. Lawyers with a taste for physics have described it as Schrodinger's party. A homelier name better suits the legal object at its centre: the Phantom Merger, a merger that exists within a single House of the legislature and nowhere on earth outside it.
This article explains the anti-defection law from its origins, and then takes up the question at the centre of the April 2026 episode: whether seven MPs who cross together as a two-thirds bloc remain within the law's reach, or whether the Constitution in fact permits a Phantom Merger. Upon that question hangs the applicability of the anti-defection law itself: if the merger claim holds, the law is never reached; if it fails, the law applies with full force. It is also the question a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court is scheduled to answer in December 2026.
A word of framing is necessary at the outset. What follows is not political commentary. It takes no side between any party or leader, attributes no motive, and expresses no view on proceedings pending before constitutional authorities. Every fact stated is drawn from the public record, and every proposition of law carries its source. The article has the one ambition that a piece of public-law writing ought to have: that a reader who has never opened the Constitution should finish it equipped to argue both sides of the question.
I. The facts, stated without adjectives
- On 24/04/2026, seven of the 10 Rajya Sabha members of the Aam Aadmi Party announced that they had resigned from the party and would merge with the Bharatiya Janata Party. The announcement described the step as the members merging themselves with the other party, and expressly invoked the protection of the Constitution's merger provision on the footing that seven of 10 satisfies the two-thirds requirement.
- On 26/04/2026, a member of the party petitioned the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha for the disqualification of the seven under the anti-defection provisions, contending that the members of a legislature group cannot, by themselves, decide upon or claim a merger of the party.
- On 27/04/2026, the Chairman recognised the seven as members of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The Aam Aadmi Party's strength in the Council fell from 10 to three. The disqualification petition remains pending as this article goes to publication.
Both positions are seriously arguable, and each commands authority. That is precisely what makes these the most consequential two sentences in Indian constitutional law at present.
II. The anti-defection law, in plain terms
The story begins in 1967. The fourth general elections produced fractured State legislatures, and with them an era in which legislators changed allegiance with the frequency of commuters changing platforms. A Haryana legislator named Gaya Lal crossed the floor more than once within a fortnight and bequeathed the language a phrase that has outlived him: aaya Ram gaya Ram. Defection in that era was seldom an act of conscience; it was a transaction, and the consideration was frequently a ministerial berth.
Parliament's first response was inquiry. The Committee on Defections, chaired by the then Home Minister Y.B. Chavan, reported in 1969 that floor-crossings had run into the hundreds within roughly a year of the 1967 elections, and that a striking proportion of defectors had been rewarded with office. Two constitutional amendment bills, in 1973 and 1978, attempted to give the Committee's recommendations legislative form; both failed.
The law finally arrived in 1985. The Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act inserted the Tenth Schedule, universally known as the anti-defection law. Its Statement of Objects and Reasons opens with a sentence the courts continue to quote, recording that the evil of political defections had become a matter of national concern.
The Schedule's central rule is straightforward. A member elected on a party's ticket holds a seat tied to that party in two respects. The seat is forfeited if the member voluntarily gives up membership of the party, and it is forfeited if the member votes, or abstains, contrary to the party's direction in the House without prior permission, unless the party condones the lapse within 15 days. An independent member cannot join any party after election; a nominated member is allowed six months within which to choose.
Two features of this rule deserve emphasis.
- Voluntarily giving up membership does not require a letter of resignation. The Supreme Court has held that conduct alone suffices: campaigning for a rival, or writing to the Governor in support of a rival claimant to power (Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994; Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, 2007). Membership, in other words, may be surrendered by conduct as surely as by letter.
- Even a member expelled by the party is treated as continuing to belong to it for the purposes of this law, so that an expelled member who joins another party forfeits the seat as well (G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 1996).
The Schedule then carves out exactly two exceptions. One protects a member who relinquishes his party in order to serve neutrally as a presiding officer. The other is the merger exception, and it is the provision upon which the present controversy turns.
Three further developments complete the framework.
- In 1992, a Constitution Bench in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu upheld the Schedule, held that a Speaker or Chairman deciding a disqualification acts as a tribunal whose decision the courts may review on limited grounds, and struck down the clause that had sought to exclude the courts altogether.
- In 2003, the Ninety-first Amendment deleted the Schedule's original third exception, the split, under which one-third of a legislature party could break away with impunity; the split had become the standard instrument for laundering collective defection. The same amendment added a substantial sanction: a member disqualified for defection is also barred, for the remainder of the term, from appointment as a Minister and from holding any remunerative political post (Articles 75(1B) and 361B).
- In 2020, in Keisham Meghachandra Singh, the Supreme Court held that disqualification petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months, and suggested that Parliament consider entrusting the jurisdiction to an independent tribunal in place of the presiding officer.
The consequence is that, after 2003, the Schedule preserves precisely one collective exit from disqualification: the merger. Everything now turns upon the meaning of that word.
III. Why this case begins, and ends, inside the anti-defection law
Before the merger debate is joined, one point of architecture deserves to be made explicit, because it is the point on which this entire controversy is an anti-defection case and nothing else. The operative provision is Paragraph 2(1)(a): a member who voluntarily gives up membership of the party that set him up is disqualified. Public resignation from that party, followed by admission into another, is the paradigm of the provision; on the settled conduct test it requires no gloss at all.
Notably, the seven members have not publicly contended otherwise. Their announcement did not deny the reach of Paragraph 2(1)(a); it invoked Paragraph 4. And Paragraph 4 opens with words that concede the architecture, providing that a member of a House shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 in the circumstances it then describes. By its own terms, the merger provision is not a parallel regime for the reorganisation of parties; it is an exception carved into the disqualification that the Schedule imposes.
One reaches for a shield only against a sword already drawn.
Both sides of the pending petition therefore agree upon the frame. The petitioner contends that the disqualification stands because the exception fails; the seven contend that the exception applies. The merger debate that occupies the remainder of this article is accordingly not a digression from the applicability of the anti-defection law; it is the last question left standing within it. If the arithmetic reading prevails, the law is excluded from every two-thirds crossing. If the twin-condition reading prevails, the exception never opens and the law operates according to its terms.
IV. The two-thirds rule: the two sentences at the heart of the controversy
Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule houses the merger exception. Its first sub-paragraph protects a member from disqualification where his original political party merges with another political party, and the member claims that he and other members of his original political party have become members of the merged entity, or have declined the merger and chosen to function as a separate group. Its second sub-paragraph then provides that, for that purpose, the merger of the original political party shall be deemed to have taken place if, and only if, not less than two-thirds of the members of the legislature party concerned have agreed to such merger.
The vocabulary merits attention, for the Schedule itself defines it. The legislature party is the body of a party's members within a particular House. The original political party is the party as an organisation outside the House: the entity that conferred the ticket. The Schedule maintains this distinction throughout, and Paragraph 4 deploys both terms in a single breath: the merger belongs to the original political party; the two-thirds who agree belong to the legislature party.
Two readings of these sixty-odd words have divided presiding officers, High Courts and scholars for a decade. Each is set out below at its strongest.
V. The first reading: arithmetic sufficiency
On this reading, the second sub-paragraph is a complete and self-contained definition. The phrase if, and only if is the language of logic: it states a condition at once necessary and sufficient. Where not less than two-thirds of a party's members in a House agree to merge with another party, the Constitution deems the party's merger to have taken place, and the inquiry ends there. No resolution of the party organisation is required, because the office of a deeming provision is to treat as done that which has not in fact been done. Were a real organisational merger a prerequisite, the argument runs, the deeming would be left with no work to perform.
The arithmetic reading also claims the virtue of administrability. A Speaker or Chairman can count. A presiding officer is ill-equipped to adjudicate contested questions of a party's internal governance: which organ was competent, whether a meeting was validly convened, what the party constitution requires. A bright-line headcount spares the presiding officer any excursion into the internal affairs of political parties.
It also commands the weight of practice. Presiding officers have applied it repeatedly.
- In Telangana in 2016, where 12 of the 15 members of one legislature party were recognised as having merged into the ruling party.
- In Goa in 2019, where 10 of the 15 members of one party and two of the three members of another crossed together.
- In Rajasthan in 2019, where all six members elected on one party's ticket merged into the ruling party.
- In Sikkim in 2019, where 10 of 13 crossed, and in Goa again in 2022, where eight of 11 did.
- In the Rajya Sabha in June 2019, where four of the six members of a party in the Council resolved, in terms, to merge the legislature party with the ruling party, and were recognised as such the following day, over their party's written objection that they lacked the authority to do so.
The limiting case is instructive: a party with a single member in a House discovered that one member is, arithmetically, his own two-thirds.
Judicially, the arithmetic reading is the law of one High Court. The Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court upheld it by judgement dated 24/02/2022, and again in 2025, in each instance affirming the Speaker's refusal to disqualify members who had crossed as a two-thirds bloc while their party continued in existence.
The consequence of this reading, in the present controversy and in every future one, is stark in its simplicity: the anti-defection law does not reach a bloc that crosses at two-thirds strength.
VI. The second reading: the twin condition
On this reading, Paragraph 4 prescribes two conditions, not one. The first sub-paragraph states the foundational event in plain indicative language, that the member's original political party merges with another political party. The second sub-paragraph then supplies a House-level quorum: even a genuine organisational merger will not protect the members of a given House unless two-thirds of that legislature party have agreed to it. The party performs the merger; the legislators accept it or decline it.
The textual arguments are cumulative.
- The phrase agreed to such merger presupposes a merger existing independently of the agreement; assent cannot conjure its own object, and the word such refers back to the merger of the original political party.
- The protective claim the member must advance under the first sub-paragraph is framed at the level of the party, that he and any other members of his original political party have become members of the other party, a claim difficult to voice while the original party subsists with its office-bearers, primary membership and symbol.
- The separate-group limb, which shields members who have not accepted the merger, is intelligible only if a merger is an event external to the members' own choice, something done to them which they may refuse.
- Upon settled principle, a deeming fiction is confined to the purpose for which it was created (State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak, 1953; Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, 1955); the purpose here, it is argued, is to fix the quorum and the date for a real merger and to spare the presiding officer an inquiry into organisational formalities, not to permit a House faction to manufacture the event itself.
Structure and history are pressed in aid. While the Schedule's split exception survived, it rested upon the same two-level architecture, and a five-Judge Bench in Rajendra Singh Rana (2007) held that a split in the original political party was the condition precedent which had to exist before the House arithmetic could be counted. In 2023, the Constitution Bench in Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra held that a legislature party has no existence independent of the political party: the party confers the ticket, appoints the whip and administers the discipline.
There is, finally, the purposive point: Parliament deleted the one-third split in 2003 precisely because it laundered collective defection; to read the merger clause as a pure headcount, it is argued, is to restore the same device at a two-thirds threshold under a different name. Within the Bombay High Court itself, a Full Bench in Shah Faruq Shabir v. Govindrao Ramu Vasave has been invoked for the proposition that the merger must emanate from outside the House and be demonstrated before the deeming is reached.
The twin-condition reading concludes where this article began: with the Phantom Merger. If arithmetic alone suffices, a party may stand merged within one House while it lives, governs and litigates everywhere else, and a single-member legislature party may be merged by its single member. A fiction, its proponents contend, is not to be stretched into paradox.
The consequence of this reading is the mirror image: the exception never opens, Paragraph 2(1)(a) operates according to its terms, and the anti-defection law applies to a two-thirds crossing with undiluted force.
VII. The case before the Supreme Court
Which reading is correct? This article deliberately offers no answer, for two reasons. The first is professional: the question is sub judice twice over, in a disqualification petition pending before the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and in an appeal pending before the Supreme Court, and a published article is not the forum in which to argue either. The second is more arresting: no authoritative answer exists, because the Supreme Court has never decided the point.
It has come close. A challenge to the Goa Bench's 2022 judgement was rendered infructuous when that Assembly's term expired, the fate that has quietly extinguished most defection litigation in this country. In December 2024, a fresh direct challenge was relegated to the High Court. Against the High Court's 2025 judgement, however, the Supreme Court has now granted leave in Girish Chodankar v. Speaker, Goa Legislative Assembly, SLP(C) No. 5256 of 2025, framing the issue as whether a legislature party may claim the defence of merger without the approval of the original political party merely because it musters two-thirds, and listing the appeal for final hearing before a three-Judge Bench in December 2026.
The case outlives its urgency but not its legislature.
On this occasion, mootness offers no escape. The Rajya Sabha is a continuing House; it does not dissolve. The members at the centre of the April 2026 episode hold terms running to 2028 and 2030. Whatever the Court decides will determine a live controversy, and with live consequences: a member disqualified for defection forfeits not only the seat but, for the remainder of the term, the capacity to serve as a Minister or to hold any remunerative political post.
VIII. Why the question matters beyond the Bar
Because the answer settles questions larger than any single episode, and older than the Schedule itself.
Most immediately, it settles whether the anti-defection law, now in its fifth decade, retains any application to a coordinated exit, or whether compliance with it has become a question of arithmetic. Beyond that, it settles what a political party is in Indian constitutional law: an organisation that acts through its own organs, or a label that travels with whichever two-thirds of its legislators walk together. It settles what the 2003 amendment achieved: whether Parliament closed the door on collective defection or merely shifted the threshold from one-third to two-thirds. It settles, in the most practical sense, what a vote cast for a party's symbol carries with it, which is the very question the Tenth Schedule was enacted to answer in 1985.
And it revives an institutional question the Supreme Court has itself posed: whether the presiding officer of a House, however exalted the office, should remain the tribunal for defection disputes within it, or whether the independent tribunal suggested in Keisham Meghachandra Singh is an idea whose time has come. That question belongs to Parliament rather than to the courts or to commentary; but December's hearing will place it squarely back on the table.
Sixty words, and what they decide
Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule is two sentences long. Some sixty words determine whether a political party is a thing that can be merged only by the people who constitute it outside the legislature, or a thing that can be counted out of existence by the people who represent it within one House.
In December 2026, three judges of the Supreme Court will read those sixty words. Read them yourself before they do; the Constitution of India is a public document that belongs to you.
Which merger does the text disclose to you, the party's or the members'? Would your answer change if the two-thirds were two hundred, or if the legislature party comprised exactly one member? And should the judge of these disputes remain the presiding officer of the House, or an independent tribunal? Constitutional law has never belonged only to lawyers. It concerns what a vote means after it is cast.
Two-minute explainers on the questions these essays raise.
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Sources and provisions referred to
Statutes and rules
- Constitution of India: Tenth Schedule, including Paragraph 4; Articles 75(1B) and 361B
- Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985
- Constitution (Ninety-first Amendment), 2003
Cases
- Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)
- Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994)
- G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly (1996)
- Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007)
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020)
- Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023)
- State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak (1953)
- Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar (1955)
- Shah Faruq Shabir v. Govindrao Ramu Vasave, Full Bench, Bombay High Court
- Girish Chodankar v. Speaker, Goa Legislative Assembly, SLP(C) No. 5256 of 2025
- Bombay High Court, Goa Bench, judgement dated 24/02/2022, and the 2025 judgement under appeal
Frequently asked questions
What is the anti-defection law in India?
It is the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, inserted by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985. It provides that a member elected on a party's ticket forfeits the seat if he voluntarily gives up membership of that party, or if he votes or abstains contrary to the party whip without permission and the lapse is not condoned within 15 days. Independent members cannot join a party after election; nominated members have six months to choose.
Does a member have to resign in writing to be disqualified?
No. The Supreme Court has held that voluntarily giving up membership is established by conduct alone, without any letter of resignation. Campaigning for a rival party, or writing to the Governor in support of a rival claimant to power, has been held sufficient. A member expelled by his party is also treated as continuing to belong to it for the purposes of the Schedule, so joining another party still costs him the seat.
What is the two-thirds merger rule?
Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule protects a member from disqualification where his original political party merges with another party, and provides that such a merger is deemed to have taken place if, and only if, not less than two-thirds of the members of the legislature party have agreed to it. Since the Ninety-first Amendment deleted the one-third split exception in 2003, the merger is the only collective exit from disqualification the Schedule preserves.
What is the Phantom Merger?
It is the situation in which a party stands merged into a rival inside a single House of the legislature while remaining fully alive outside it: registered with the Election Commission, holding its symbol, and contesting the very party into which it has supposedly dissolved. Whether the Constitution permits such a state of affairs depends on whether two-thirds arithmetic inside the House is sufficient by itself, or whether the party organisation must merge first.
What will the Supreme Court decide in December 2026?
In Girish Chodankar v. Speaker, Goa Legislative Assembly, SLP(C) No. 5256 of 2025, a three-Judge Bench is listed to decide whether a legislature party can claim the merger defence without the approval of the original political party merely because it musters two-thirds. Unlike earlier defection litigation, which was often rendered infructuous when the Assembly's term expired, the question now arises from the Rajya Sabha, a continuing House, so the appeal cannot be rendered moot.
These answers are educational summaries of the article above; they are not legal advice on any individual matter.
Corrections: if you find an error of law or fact in this article, write to contact@lokeshbhardwajlawoffices.com with the subject 'Correction'. Corrections are made in the text and noted here with the date.
This article is published for general information and public legal education only. It does not constitute legal advice and does not create an advocate-client relationship. It expresses no opinion on the merits of any proceeding pending before any court, tribunal or constitutional authority, and takes no position for or against any political party or individual. Facts and judgements are drawn from the public record as on 06/08/2026, and the law stated is liable to change. Readers should obtain advice specific to their own facts before acting. Published in compliance with the Bar Council of India Rules, Chapter II, Part VI, Rule 36. No part of this article is intended to solicit professional engagement.
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