Lokesh Bhardwaj Law Offices ← Articles
Lokesh Bhardwaj Law Offices · Advocates and Legal Consultants, New Delhi · lokeshbhardwajlawoffices.com
Competition & Regulatory · Explainer

The market you are locked into.

How Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 reach the agreement nobody wrote down and the market a business did not know it controlled.

22 September 202613 minute read
Last reviewed: 17/10/2026
AGREEMENT, DOMINANCE, MARKET THE AGREEMENT SECTION 3 RELEVANT MARKET strength enough to act alone DOMINANT SECTION 4 the agreement need not be written, and the market need not be the one you sell in
Section 3 asks whether firms agreed. Section 4 asks, first, what the market is; the boundary decides the case.

I. Why the law exists

Every market has a tendency to close. Firms that compete hard on Monday have an incentive, by Friday, to agree instead; firms that win fairly have an incentive to pull the ladder up behind them. Neither impulse is wicked, and both are rational. Competition law exists because the sum of those impulses is a market that no longer works for the people it is meant to serve.

The Supreme Court set out the economic case in its first substantial decision on the Competition Act, 2002 (the "Act"). The object is economic efficiency, allocative, productive and dynamic; the concern with monopoly is not that being big is undesirable, but that control over price produces efficiency losses to society and can degrade quality and diversity.

The law therefore punishes neither size nor success, and does not protect competitors from being beaten. It protects the process of competition, which Section 18 makes the statutory duty of the Competition Commission of India.

II. Section 3, agreements

Section 3(1) prohibits any agreement in respect of goods or services which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India; Section 3(2) makes it void. Under Section 2(b) an agreement need not be written, formal or enforceable: an arrangement, understanding or action in concert suffices.

Horizontal agreements, Section 3(3)

Between enterprises in identical or similar trade, four categories are presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition:

The presumption is rebuttable but reverses the practical burden, and a proviso saves genuine efficiency-enhancing joint ventures. A second proviso, inserted by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 with effect from 18/05/2023, extends the presumption to a party not in identical trade which participates, or intends to participate, in furthering the agreement. That closes the hub-and-spoke gap, where competitors never speak to each other but each speaks to a common distributor, association, consultant or pricing tool.

Vertical agreements, Section 3(4)

Tie-in arrangements, exclusive dealing, exclusive distribution, refusal to deal and resale price maintenance contravene Section 3(1) only if they cause or are likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition. There is no presumption and the burden lies on the Commission. The 2023 amendment made the vertical relationship illustrative rather than exhaustive, extended the clauses to services, and excluded agreements with an end consumer.

Carve-outs, Section 3(5)

Reasonable conditions necessary to protect specified intellectual property rights, and the right to export, are preserved, but the carve-out is narrower than it is assumed to be: the holder must hold a valid right in India, the conditions must be both reasonable and necessary, and confidentiality or trade secret is not among the listed statutes.

Assessing appreciable adverse effect on competition

Appreciable adverse effect on competition is assessed on the Section 19(3) factors:

Since 2023 foreclosure stands as a factor in its own right, and consumer harm may be weighed against an agreement rather than merely the absence of benefit.

Two decisions that mark the boundaries

In Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India the Supreme Court held that the Director General (the "DG"), once directed to investigate, is not confined to the four corners of the information. In Rajasthan Cylinders and Containers Ltd. v. Union of India the Court allowed the suppliers' appeals and set aside findings of bid rigging: only three public sector companies buy 14.2 kg LPG cylinders, and in such an oligopsony identical bids are consistent with the pricing power of the buyer rather than agreement among sellers. The Commission may follow the evidence beyond the complaint, but it must still find an agreement, and a chart of similar prices is not one.

III. Section 4, abuse of dominance

Section 4(1) provides that no enterprise or group shall abuse its dominant position. It does not prohibit acquiring or keeping one. The Explanation defines dominance as strength in the relevant market in India enabling the enterprise either to operate independently of competitive forces or to affect its competitors, consumers or the market in its favour; the limbs are disjunctive. Section 19(4) lists thirteen factors, of which market share is only the first, and there is no statutory threshold, so dominance is always a finding of fact.

Section 4(2) is an exhaustive list of five abuses:

Conduct outside those clauses is not an abuse in India, however troubling.

IV. The relevant market, and the aftermarket

Nothing in Section 4 can be applied until the relevant market is defined, because dominance is dominance in a relevant market and leveraging requires two of them. Market definition is not a formality; it is very often the whole case. Section 2(t), as substituted from 18/05/2023, defines the relevant product market on two limbs, demand-side and, newly, supply-side substitution, and Sections 19(6) and 19(7) make switching costs an express factor on both sides.

Hence the practical question. A consumer buys a car in a market where a dozen manufacturers fight for the sale, then buys parts and repairs for that one car for eight or ten years. If the two are one market, no maker is dominant and Section 4 has nothing to bite on. If the parts of each brand form a market of their own, each maker is close to a monopolist in it, however small its share of car sales. The economics is lock-in: parts of one brand do not fit another, and the residual value of a newly registered car falls below its purchase price, so escaping a rise in parts prices by selling and rebuying means an immediate capital loss.

Manufacturers answer with whole life costing, that competition in the primary market disciplines the aftermarket because buyers factor lifetime running costs into the purchase. That succeeds only if buyers have reliable information about lifetime costs when they buy, which is a question of fact. The same structure arises wherever a durable product is followed by proprietary parts or servicing: printers and cartridges, medical equipment and reagents, lifts and maintenance, devices and app stores.

V. The car case

Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. remains the leading Indian authority. An individual car owner filed information on 18/01/2011 against three manufacturers: genuine spare parts were not sold in the open market, and the diagnostic tools, manuals and software needed to service a modern car went only to authorised dealers, so independent workshops could not repair his vehicle. The Commission directed an investigation on 24/02/2011, extended it to the whole industry, and by its order of 25/08/2014 dealt with fourteen manufacturers.

Parts were made for particular models, interchangeability was minimal, and warranties were affected by parts from other channels, so substitutability across makers was close to nil; lifetime service costs could not realistically be estimated at purchase and were treated by several makers as confidential, so whole life costing failed on the evidence. The Commission held that the parts of each brand form a distinct relevant product market, that repair and maintenance services form a further distinct market, and that the geographic market in each case is India.

Each manufacturer was found dominant, indeed close to monopolistic, in parts for its own brand: original equipment suppliers were restrained by contract from selling into the open market without prior written consent, and diagnostic tools went to authorised dealers alone. Each was dominant although none was dominant in the sale of cars. Dominance in a narrow but correctly defined market is dominance for Section 4.

The conduct fell within four limbs:

It also contravened Sections 3(4)(b), (c) and (d), the Commission being prepared to infer an unwritten arrangement where the agreement was silent but the practice uniform. The intellectual property defence failed: several makers could not link a claimed right to a particular part, rights often being held by a foreign parent and worked in India under a technology transfer agreement, and intellectual property is territorial; and a requirement of prior consent before a supplier could sell into the aftermarket, never once granted, operated as a prohibition rather than a reasonable condition.

VI. Leveraging

Section 4(2)(e) covers both entering a new market on the back of dominance elsewhere and protecting an adjacent one. It needs dominance in one relevant market, a second distinct relevant market, and use of the first to affect the second. The spare parts case is the clearest illustration, and the mechanism is the point: the manufacturer did not have to be dominant in repair services at all, only to control an input which repair services could not be supplied without.

The Commission applied the same architecture on 20/10/2022 in the Android mobile device ecosystem, imposing a penalty of Rs. 1,337.76 crore for contraventions including Section 4(2)(e); the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal upheld the finding and the penalty on 29/03/2023 while setting aside four behavioural directions, and appeals are pending in the Supreme Court. The provision is therefore structural rather than an automobile or a technology provision: wherever a business controls something rivals in a second market cannot do without, whether a part, a tool, a code, an interface, a data set or a distribution channel, the terms of access are a competition law question.

VII. Procedure, and fairness at each stage

How an inquiry begins

Section 19(1) permits inquiry on the Commission's own motion, on information from any person, consumer or association, or on a reference. The informant need not be a competitor or a person injured in a private law sense; the spare parts case began with one car owner. Since 18/05/2023 an information must be filed within three years of the cause of action, subject to condonation. The mechanics sit in the CCI (General) Regulations, 2024, which repealed the General Regulations, 2009 outright on 17/09/2024, so any checklist citing the 2009 numbering is out of date.

The investigation by the Director General

If a prima facie case exists the Commission directs the Director General to investigate under Section 26(1). In Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. the Supreme Court held that such a direction is administrative, determines no rights and is not appealable, and that no party can claim notice or hearing at that stage, although reasons must still be recorded with reference to the material. An order under Section 26(2) closing the matter is, by contrast, final and appealable, and an interim order under Section 33 requires a satisfaction of a much higher degree than a prima facie view. The powers of the Director General were recast in 2023: production of records, examination on oath recorded and signed, retention of documents for 180 days, and search and seizure only on the authorisation of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi. The Explanation defines "agent" to include legal advisors, and the interaction with professional privilege is unresolved.

The report, objections and the hearing

After the report, the non-confidential version is forwarded and the parties have eight weeks to object. Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. described the duty at this stage as notice, the report, objections and a hearing. Since 19/09/2024 the proviso to Section 26(9) makes it express: before any order under Section 27 the Commission shall issue a show cause notice indicating the contraventions alleged and give a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Regulation 49 requires a separate show cause notice of not less than 15 days before any penalty, and Regulation 41(5) entitles a party to cross-examine where oral evidence led by another is relied on against it. Section 36(1) requires the Commission to be guided by the principles of natural justice throughout, and in Mahindra Electric Mobility Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India the Delhi High Court declared Section 22(3) void except its proviso, the vice being the casting vote of the Chairperson in an adjudicatory body, directed that those who hear the final arguments must decide, upheld the other impugned provisions, and directed that parties be heard on penalty. The casting vote was omitted from Section 22(3) in 2023.

Penalties, commitments and settlement

Penalties under Section 27(b), as substituted from 06/03/2024, may reach ten per cent of average turnover or income for the last three preceding financial years, and Explanation 2 defines turnover as global turnover from all products and services. The relevant turnover principle of Excel Crop Care construed the unamended provision, so advice on exposure which still assumes it requires revisiting; the counterweight is Section 64B, under which the Commission must publish penalty guidelines, consider them, and give reasons for departing from them. Two routes avoid a contested order, both confined to Section 3(4) and Section 4 matters and never available for cartels: a commitment under Section 48B before receipt of the report of the Director General, with no finding of contravention, and a settlement under Section 48A after it. Neither is appealable. Cartel members have leniency under Section 46, with leniency plus since 20/02/2024.

VIII. Challenging the Commission

Section 53A(1)(a) makes only specified orders appealable to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, which replaced the Competition Appellate Tribunal from 26/05/2017. The 2023 amendment widened the list to include orders under Section 6(6) and Sections 26(2), (2A), (6) and (9), so a final order at the end of an inquiry is now expressly appealable. Orders not specified cannot be appealable by implication, which is why a Section 26(1) direction cannot be appealed; grounds against it may be taken in the appeal against the final order. An appeal lies within sixty days, a proviso inserted in 2023 requires an appellant liable to pay any amount to deposit twenty-five per cent of it, and Section 53T provides a further appeal to the Supreme Court. Article 226 is not ousted but is heavily conditioned: writs have been entertained on vires, absence of jurisdiction and gross violation of natural justice, not to review the material behind a prima facie opinion.

Where a sectoral regulator is involved, Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd. requires a sequence rather than an exclusion. Jurisdictional facts within the domain of the regulator are for it to decide first, and until then the matter cannot go further; but the Commission is not ousted, because the regulator acts only under its own statute and only the Commission can apply this Act.

IX. The comparative position

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union correspond to Sections 3 and 4, but Article 102 gives no closed list of abuses whereas Section 4(2) is exhaustive. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission supplies the foundational definition of dominance, holds that abuse is an objective concept, and records, following United Brands Company v. Commission, that lively competition does not rule out dominance, which maps onto the two disjunctive limbs of the Explanation to Section 4. European law on leveraging had to be built by the courts and requires closely associated markets, so Section 4(2)(e) is the easier of the two to plead; in the Android litigation the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal on 02/07/2026 and confirmed a fine of EUR 4.125 billion.

Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 1890 addresses monopolisation, being the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power by exclusionary conduct rather than growth on the merits, whereas Indian law asks only whether the conduct falls within Section 4(2). On aftermarkets the leading authority is Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., where the Supreme Court of the United States rejected as a matter of law the proposition that competition in the equipment market precludes market power in parts and service, the very argument the Indian manufacturers advanced twenty-two years later.

X. Why this matters

Four propositions follow.

Competition law protects the small operator: the independent repairer denied a part and a fault code is usually a micro or small enterprise for which denial of an input is closure, not inconvenience.

The counter-case deserves to be stated fairly.

The answer is not denial but discipline: rigorous market definition, evidence of effects rather than assumption, proportionate penalties, and fairness at every stage.
Watch · The Office on YouTube

Two-minute explainers on the questions these essays raise.

The Office publishes short video versions of its long-form writing. Subscribe to be notified when the explainer for this article is released.

Sources and provisions referred to

Statutes and rules

Treaties and conventions

Cases

Frequently asked questions

We never signed anything. Can there still be an anti-competitive agreement?

Yes. Section 2(b) of the Competition Act, 2002 defines an agreement to include any arrangement, understanding or action in concert, whether or not it is written, formal or intended to be enforceable. Between competitors, Section 3(3) presumes an appreciable adverse effect on competition in price fixing, limiting production or supply, market sharing and bid rigging. Since 18/05/2023 the presumption also reaches a party outside that trade which participates, or intends to participate, in furthering the agreement, which covers a common distributor, association, consultant or pricing tool.

Does a large market share by itself make our company dominant?

No. Section 19(4) of the Competition Act, 2002 lists thirteen factors, of which market share is only the first, and the statute fixes no threshold, so dominance is always a finding of fact. The Explanation to Section 4 asks whether the enterprise has strength in the relevant market in India enabling it either to operate independently of competitive forces or to affect its competitors, consumers or the market in its favour, and those limbs are disjunctive. Dominance itself is lawful. Only the five abuses listed in Section 4(2) are prohibited.

Can our spare parts and after sales policy be a competition law problem?

It can. In Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd., decided on 25/08/2014, the Competition Commission of India held that the spare parts of each brand form a distinct relevant market and repair services a further one, so fourteen manufacturers were dominant in parts for their own cars although none was dominant in selling cars. Withholding parts, diagnostic tools and fault codes was unfair conditions, denial of market access and leveraging. The same structure arises with printers and cartridges, equipment and reagents, and lifts and maintenance.

What penalty can the Competition Commission of India impose, and can a case be settled?

Under Section 27(b) of the Competition Act, 2002, as substituted from 06/03/2024, a penalty may reach ten per cent of average turnover or income for the three preceding financial years, and Explanation 2 defines turnover as global turnover from all products and services. Section 64B requires the Commission to publish penalty guidelines, consider them, and give reasons for departing from them. Two routes avoid a contested order, both confined to Section 3(4) and Section 4 matters and never available for cartels: a commitment under Section 48B before the Director General reports, and a settlement under Section 48A after it.

Can an order of the Commission be appealed, and what happens in the meantime?

Section 53A(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 makes only specified orders appealable to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, which replaced the Competition Appellate Tribunal from 26/05/2017. The 2023 amendment widened the list to include orders under Section 6(6) and Sections 26(2), (2A), (6) and (9). An appeal lies within sixty days, and an appellant liable to pay any amount must deposit twenty-five per cent of it. A direction to investigate under Section 26(1) is administrative and not appealable; those grounds are taken in the appeal against the final order. A further appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Section 53T.

These answers are educational summaries of the article above; they are not legal advice on any individual matter.

Corrections: if you find an error of law or fact in this article, write to contact@lokeshbhardwajlawoffices.com with the subject 'Correction'. Corrections are made in the text and noted here with the date.

Disclaimer

This article is published for general information and public legal education only. It does not constitute legal advice and does not create an advocate-client relationship. Every agreement, market and course of conduct turns on its own facts, documents and economic evidence, and the law stated is as understood on 22/09/2026 and is liable to change. Readers should obtain advice specific to their own facts before acting. Published in compliance with the Bar Council of India Rules, Chapter II, Part VI, Rule 36. No part of this article is intended to solicit professional engagement or to advertise.

WhatsApp