What the Declaration actually commits to.
A reading of the 18th BRICS Summit outcome of 12 and 13 September 2026: the one agreement heading for signature, the payment system that does not exist, and why paragraph 116 is really about the G20.
On 12/09/2026, at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, the leaders of the BRICS countries adopted the New Delhi Declaration at the close of the eighteenth BRICS Summit, held under the Indian Chairship theme "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability". The document runs to well over 120 numbered paragraphs. It is not a treaty. It creates no directly enforceable rights and imposes no directly enforceable obligations on any state, company or individual.
The short point
Declarations of this kind are the soil in which binding instruments later grow. Read as a lawyer reads a term sheet, the New Delhi Declaration tells you which instruments are close to signature, which are still at the level of committees and pilot projects, and which are political language that will not touch a contract for many years, if ever.
This article attempts that reading. It is written for an international audience and it takes no side on any of the contested political questions the Declaration addresses. Where the Declaration records a position, we report it as the position of the member governments who adopted it, and we note where other states take a different view. Our object is to be useful, not persuasive.
I. What kind of document is this?
Three legal characteristics matter.
First, it is a consensus political statement, not an agreement. BRICS has no founding charter, no permanent secretariat and no dispute settlement mechanism. Its output is produced by rotating Chairship, agreed by consensus, and expressed in the language of "we welcome", "we encourage", "we take note of", and "we reaffirm". None of those verbs creates a legal obligation. Compare this with the language of a treaty, which uses "shall" and attaches a ratification clause.
Second, its binding force, where it exists at all, arrives later and elsewhere. A declaration can matter legally in four ways. It can signal a forthcoming treaty, as the Declaration does for customs cooperation. It can constitute subsequent practice relevant to the interpretation of an existing treaty under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, where the parties to that treaty are the ones speaking. It can shape the negotiating position of a bloc inside a treaty body such as the World Trade Organization or the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. And it can, over long periods and with wide repetition, contribute to the formation of customary international law through opinio juris, though a single declaration by a coalition of states falls far short of that.
Third, the internal hierarchy of the text is the whole game. A reader who treats every paragraph as equally weighty will misread the document badly. Paragraph 99, which records that members are ready to sign a customs agreement subject to completion of national processes, is legally live. Paragraph 90, which encourages a Payment Task Force to continue discussions on cross-border payments, is not. Both sit in the same document and use the same register.
We return to this hierarchy in section 5, where we set it out in text format.
II. The architecture of the Declaration
The text is organised under four broad headings, following the three traditional pillars of BRICS cooperation together with a Chairship-specific opening.
- Inclusive global governance and strengthening multilateralism (paragraphs 7 to 22): United Nations reform, Bretton Woods institutions, the WTO, and unilateral coercive measures.
- International and regional peace and security (paragraphs 23 to 48): Conflict prevention, nuclear risk, West Asia, Sudan, Syria, terrorism, illicit finance, corruption, narcotics, outer space and information and communication technologies.
- Sustainable and inclusive global economic growth (paragraphs 49 to 121): Health, agriculture and food security, energy, critical minerals, industry, science and technology, the digital economy and artificial intelligence, disaster resilience, trade and value chains, the financial track, climate, biodiversity, the New Development Bank, the G20, competition law, standards, statistics, intellectual property and supreme audit institutions.
- Strengthening cultural and people-to-people cooperation (from paragraph 122): Parliamentary, business, youth, women's, academic and civil society tracks.
The distribution of paragraphs is itself informative. Roughly six paragraphs in ten concern economics, development and institutional plumbing. The Declaration is, in the main, an economic document with a political preamble.
III. The economic and commercial core
This is the part that will eventually reach commercial contracts, customs files and regulatory filings. We take the strands in the order in which counsel are likely to meet them.
3.1 Trade law and the tariff question
Paragraphs 20 and 21 are the heart of the trade section. The Declaration reaffirms support for a rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core, upholding Most-Favoured-Nation treatment and Special and Differential Treatment for developing members. It advocates the immediate restoration of a fully functioning two-tier binding dispute settlement mechanism and the appointment of new Appellate Body members without further delay. It supports the accession bids of Ethiopia and Iran. It records concern at what it describes as the proliferation of trade-restrictive actions inconsistent with WTO rules, whether in the form of rising tariffs and non-tariff measures or protectionism pursued under environmental objectives.
Paragraph 108 goes further and names a specific mechanism, opposing unilateral, punitive, discriminatory and protectionist measures not in line with international law, "such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms". Paragraph 22 condemns unilateral coercive measures, including unilateral economic sanctions and secondary sanctions, and non-Security Council authorised sanctions.
Two observations, both legal rather than political.
The Appellate Body point is the operative one. The WTO's Appellate Body has been unable to hear appeals because of the continued absence of appointments, with the practical consequence that a losing party can appeal "into the void" and stall enforcement indefinitely. Until that is resolved, a state-to-state remedy for the very measures the Declaration complains of is unavailable in the forum the Declaration says should hear them. A political declaration cannot fill that gap. The members most affected have in practice turned to interim arbitration arrangements, bilateral consultation and domestic legal challenge instead.
Domestic legal challenge has proved the more effective route in at least one significant instance this year. On 20/02/2026, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorise the President to impose tariffs. The Court reasoned that Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution vests the taxing power, of which the tariff power is a branch, in Congress; that the statutory authority to "regulate ... importation" does not include the power to tax; and that where the Executive asserts an extraordinary delegated power it must identify clear congressional authorisation. On the disposition, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which had held the challenged tariffs unauthorised, and vacated and remanded the companion case with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The measures affected were the reciprocal tariffs imposed from April 2025 and the separate tariffs founded on a declared emergency concerning illicit drugs.
A domestic constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine achieved, within a single year, a restraint on unilateral tariff action that the multilateral system had not achieved.
Counsel advising importers, exporters and supply chain managers should note what the Court expressly did not decide. It declined to rule on other tariff statutes, several of which carry their own procedural prerequisites, caps and time limits. A holding that one statute does not confer the tariff power says nothing about whether another does. An exposure analysis built on a single statutory basis is therefore a snapshot, not a position, and anyone relying on this passage should establish for themselves what authority applies to their goods on the date of entry.
3.2 The payments question, read precisely
Paragraph 90 is the paragraph most likely to be misreported internationally, so it is worth quoting its architecture rather than its adjectives. The Declaration acknowledges the work of the BRICS Payment Task Force towards "exploring pragmatic solutions" for cross-border payment mechanisms; acknowledges study of the cross-border interoperability of payment and messaging channels; notes discussions on promoting trade settlements and investments using BRICS local currencies "while respecting national priorities and acknowledging that there is no one-size-fits-all approach"; and encourages the Task Force to continue discussions.
There is no common currency in the Declaration. There is no single settlement system, no clearing house, no messaging network and no timetable. What there is, in legal terms, is a study mandate with an express reservation of national regulatory autonomy. Any report describing the Declaration as establishing a BRICS currency or a rival to existing messaging infrastructure would be describing a document other than the one adopted.
The same caution applies to paragraph 93 on the New Investment Platform, which records "constructive technical discussions" on establishing a Study Group with Terms of Reference still to be refined, and to paragraph 94 on settlement and depositary infrastructure, which records a technical workshop.
3.3 The one instrument on the treaty track
Paragraph 99 is the sleeper. The Declaration welcomes the convergence achieved on the BRICS Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters, and the willingness of members ready to proceed with its signing, subject to completion of the necessary national processes and efforts to secure participation of all BRICS countries.
This is treaty language. "Signing" and "completion of the necessary national processes" are the vocabulary of ratification. If concluded, a mutual administrative assistance agreement in customs matters would create reciprocal obligations on exchange of information, verification of origin and value, recovery assistance and coordinated enforcement. For a customs practitioner, that is a material change to the risk profile of transactions across the member states: a valuation or classification position taken in one jurisdiction becomes more easily testable in another.
The same paragraph records continued work on Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) programmes, information exchange and mutual recognition, and an intention to conduct a BRICS Joint Customs Enforcement Operation as an annual initiative. Businesses holding AEO status in one member state should watch the mutual recognition strand closely: it is the strand that converts a compliance investment into a commercial advantage.
Paragraph 118 records progress towards signing a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of standardisation among BRICS National Standards Bodies, including work on artificial intelligence standardisation. A standards Memorandum of Understanding is not a treaty, but harmonised standards reach products faster than treaties do.
3.4 Finance, guarantees and insurance
- New Development Bank (paragraph 115): Support for expanded resource mobilisation, expansion of local currency financing, diversified funding sources, membership expansion, and the launch of a BRICS-NDB Knowledge Portal under the Indian Chairship.
- Contingent Reserve Arrangement (paragraph 97): Amendments to the Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement to give it greater flexibility and responsiveness as a financial safety net, with new members expected to be onboarded voluntarily. Note that the Contingent Reserve Arrangement is an actual treaty; amendments to it are a real legal event, subject to each party's internal process.
- BRICS Multilateral Guarantees (paragraph 102): Continued technical work and development of pilot transactions, aimed at mobilising private capital and reducing financing costs. Guarantee instruments are contractually dense; the pilot stage is where the credit and enforcement terms get settled.
- Insurance and reinsurance (paragraph 92): Continued discussion of a BRICS Insurance Resilience Centre as a voluntary shared capability platform, and interest in India's proposal to host a BRICS Risk Lab at the GIFT City International Financial Services Centre in Gujarat. For Indian practitioners this is a concrete, jurisdiction-specific development worth tracking through the International Financial Services Centre regulatory framework.
- International Monetary Fund and World Bank (paragraphs 17 to 19): Pressure for entry into effect of the 16th General Review of Quotas without further delay, meaningful realignment under the 17th Review, and a World Bank shareholding realignment correcting what the Declaration calls historic underrepresentation of developing countries.
3.5 MSMEs and trade finance
Paragraph 85 is unusually practical. It identifies access to affordable finance as the primary bottleneck limiting participation of micro, small and medium enterprises in trade, welcomes BRICS Guiding Principles for Credit Assessment Frameworks for Export-oriented MSMEs that use alternative data sources to reduce information asymmetry, and welcomes the Jaipur Consensus to study establishment of an invoice discounting mechanism for BRICS members.
Invoice discounting and receivables financing platforms are the kind of initiative that reaches a small exporter's balance sheet faster than a governance reform reaches a Fund quota. Counsel advising exporters should follow the credit assessment principles: where alternative data is used for credit scoring, data protection and fair-processing obligations follow immediately behind.
3.6 Tax, competition, anti-corruption and illicit finance
- Tax (paragraph 98): Commitment to constructive engagement in the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and its protocols, together with new working groups on international taxation and transfer pricing, and on revenue statistics. The United Nations track on tax is a genuinely consequential forum question, and the Declaration places the bloc's weight there.
- Competition (paragraph 117): Deeper cooperation in competition law and policy, with attention to renewable energy markets, while respecting each state's national laws. Merger control and cartel enforcement cooperation between authorities usually precedes any formal instrument; the practical effect is information flow.
- Anti-corruption and asset recovery (paragraph 43): A BRICS Expert Network on Asset Recovery, a Repository on Informal Cooperation for Tracing Fugitive Offenders, and continuing discussion of a Network of Law Enforcement Practitioners on fugitive offenders, all framed by the United Nations Convention against Corruption. For counsel in extradition and asset tracing work, informal cooperation networks change the practical speed of tracing long before any treaty is amended.
- Illicit finance and fraud (paragraph 42): Express concern about organised scam networks, cross-border fraud operations and "scam compounds", and about laundering schemes exploiting invoicing practices, professional services and cross-border contractual arrangements. That last phrase should be read carefully by professional service firms everywhere. It signals appetite for scrutiny of intermediaries.
- Cybercrime (paragraph 47): Encouragement to all states to consider signing and ratifying the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime so as to secure its rapid entry into force, and continued negotiation of a supplementary protocol. Entry into force of that Convention would be a real change to mutual legal assistance in electronic evidence.
3.7 Intellectual property and artificial intelligence
Paragraph 120 contains what is, to our reading, the most commercially forward-looking sentence in the document. Alongside conventional cooperation among BRICS intellectual property offices on examination, geographical indications and traditional knowledge, the Declaration records recognition of the importance of collaborating on respect for intellectual property rights in the digital environment. It then adds the phrase that matters, extending that collaboration to rights used "for artificial intelligence training purposes, as well as fair remuneration to right holders", while respecting the needs and priorities of developing countries.
It further records recognition of risks of misappropriation and misrepresentation of knowledge, heritage and cultural values that are insufficiently represented in data sets and in artificial intelligence models.
Read against paragraph 81, which commits members to implement the BRICS Leaders' Statement on the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence and notes the AI Impact Summit held in India in February 2026 and the artificial intelligence governance meeting in Shanghai, the direction of travel is legible. A substantial group of states with very large domestic markets has placed on record, collectively, that artificial intelligence training on copyright works engages rights-holder remuneration. Whether that becomes statute, licensing practice or litigation will vary by jurisdiction. It is no longer a fringe position.
3.8 Supply chains, minerals, energy and food
- Critical minerals (paragraph 67): Supply chains that guarantee benefit sharing, value addition and economic diversification in resource-rich countries, "while fully preserving sovereign rights over their mineral resources". This is resource-nationalism framing expressed in the language of sustainable development, and it will show up in mining concession negotiations.
- Global value chains (paragraph 86): Support for a BRICS Global Value Chain Action Plan 2026 to 2030, with technical cooperation on trade facilitation, intellectual property protection and connectivity.
- Special Economic Zones (paragraph 87): Cooperation among members' Special Economic Zones and digitisation of trade documentation.
- Energy (paragraphs 64 to 66): Explicit acknowledgement that fossil fuels will continue to play an important role in the world's energy mix, particularly for emerging markets, alongside technological neutrality and common but differentiated responsibilities; work on interoperable standards and certification for low-emission hydrogen.
- Food security (paragraph 60): Continued elaboration of a BRICS Grain Exchange, with possible expansion into other agricultural commodities.
- Diamonds (paragraph 88): Reaffirmed support for the Kimberley Process as the sole global intergovernmental certification scheme for rough diamonds, and welcome for India's Chairship of the Process in 2026.
IV. The political sections, reported neutrally
A law firm article is not the place for advocacy on contested conflicts. We record the Declaration's positions, and we record that they are contested.
The Declaration expresses concern at escalation in West Asia and calls for maximum restraint, protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and unhindered humanitarian access in Gaza; reaffirms support for a two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state; refers to provisional measures of the International Court of Justice in proceedings instituted by South Africa; calls for full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 in relation to Lebanon; calls for an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Sudan; and reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. It records concern about attacks on civilian infrastructure and on safeguarded nuclear facilities. It calls for an end to economic, commercial and financial measures against Cuba.
Several of these positions are not shared by other states, including states with which BRICS members maintain close relations. Reporting the Declaration accurately requires saying so.
On terrorism, paragraph 40 condemns acts of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable regardless of motivation, and condemns in the strongest terms the attack in Jammu and Kashmir on 22/04/2025 in which 26 people were killed. It calls for zero tolerance, rejects double standards, and calls for expeditious finalisation of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism at the United Nations. That the Declaration asks for finalisation is itself the point worth noticing: the instrument remains unconcluded.
On United Nations reform, paragraph 13 records that China and Russia, as permanent members of the Security Council, reiterate support for the aspirations of Brazil and India to play a greater role in the United Nations including the Security Council. The formulation is carefully limited. "Support for the aspiration to play a greater role" is not an endorsement of permanent membership, and the difference is the difference between a communique and a vote.
V. A hierarchy of legal weight
For practitioners, the following classification is more useful than the running order of the text.
- Tier A: Treaty track. An instrument exists or is ready for signature and ratification. Examples from the Declaration: BRICS Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters (para 99); amendments to the Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (para 97). What counsel should do: Track national ratification processes; model the compliance impact now.
- Tier B: Institutional and operational. A body, network or platform is being created or funded. Examples from the Declaration: New Development Bank initiatives (para 115); Expert Network on Asset Recovery (para 43); BRICS Risk Lab at GIFT City International Financial Services Centre (para 92); Centres of Excellence in health and agriculture (paras 54, 62). What counsel should do: Register interest; these change practical speed and access before they change law.
- Tier C: Standard setting and guidance. Non-binding principles capable of being adopted into domestic regulation. Examples from the Declaration: Credit Assessment Frameworks for export MSMEs (para 85); Guiding Principles on Smart Grids (para 65); standardisation Memorandum of Understanding (para 118); disaster and urban infrastructure principles (para 82). What counsel should do: Treat as early warning of regulatory content.
- Tier D: Negotiating position. A common bloc stance inside an existing treaty body. Examples from the Declaration: WTO reform and Appellate Body (para 20); International Monetary Fund quota realignment (para 18); United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (para 98); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change positions (paras 107 to 110). What counsel should do: Relevant to forecasting outcomes in those forums, not to present rights.
- Tier E: Study and exploration. Discussion, task force, pilot or feasibility stage. Examples from the Declaration: Cross-border payments (para 90); New Investment Platform (para 93); BRICS Grain Exchange (para 60); submarine cable feasibility (para 74). What counsel should do: Note and monitor; do not plan around.
- Tier F: Political declaration. Statements of position on conflicts and governance. Examples from the Declaration: Paragraphs 23 to 41. What counsel should do: Context, not commitment.
The practical lesson is that the loudest paragraphs internationally are almost always in tiers E and F, and the paragraphs that will actually alter a client's obligations are in tiers A, B and C.
VI. BRICS and the G20: a comparison, and the paragraph that repays a second reading
India is a member of both groupings. So are Brazil, China, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa, and, on the view that treats it as a full BRICS member, Saudi Arabia. The comparison is therefore not a contest between two camps. It is a question about what each forum is for.
- Composition: The G20 brings developed and developing economies together with the European Union and, since India's presidency in 2023, the African Union. BRICS is composed of emerging market and developing economies together with their partner countries. The G20 spans the divide; BRICS sits on one side of it and speaks for that side.
- Mandate: The G20 has an economic and financial mandate with a mature finance track built around central banks and finance ministries. BRICS has a three-pillar mandate that includes political and security matters, which the G20 has historically avoided. That is why the New Delhi Declaration contains paragraphs on Gaza, Sudan and Syria, and why a G20 communique ordinarily would not.
- Institutional form: Neither has a treaty founding it. Neither has a general secretariat of the kind the United Nations or the WTO possesses. Both work by consensus and by rotating presidency or chairship. The difference is that BRICS has built its own financial institutions, the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, both established by treaty, whereas the G20 works through and upon existing institutions.
- Output: Both produce declarations of the same soft-law character. The New Delhi Declaration is not less binding than a G20 leaders' declaration, and it is not more binding either.
Now to paragraph 116, which is the most interesting paragraph in the document for anyone reading the two forums together. The Declaration:
- describes the G20 as the premier global forum for international economic cooperation;
- reaffirms a willingness to preserve the legacy of the four consecutive presidencies held by BRICS members, Indonesia in 2022, India in 2023, Brazil in 2024 and South Africa in 2025;
- recognises the importance of the G20 continuing to function productively on the basis of its economic mandate, consensus decision making, depoliticised processes, integrity and, in the Declaration's own words, the "inadmissibility of arbitrary revision of its membership"; and
- underscores South Africa's status as a founding country and full member of the G20, while emphasising that any change in membership should rest on the consensus of all members and reflect geographical balance.
Three things follow.
First, BRICS has declined to position itself as a replacement for the G20. It has expressly conceded primacy in economic cooperation to the wider forum. That is a deliberate answer to the recurring international question of whether BRICS intends to build a parallel order. On the face of this text, the answer is no.
Second, the reference to arbitrary revision of membership and the express affirmation of South Africa's status are not abstract. A bloc does not draft a sentence of that kind unless something has made it necessary, and readers will supply the surrounding events for themselves from their own sources. What can be said from the text alone is this: the Declaration does not name any state, does not recite any incident, and does not use the language of complaint. It states a principle. That is how a bloc registers an objection without creating one, and it is a technique worth noticing.
Third, paragraph 116 keeps the two forums coupled rather than rival. For India in particular, that coupling is the whole strategic point.
VII. Where India stands
India occupies an unusual position, and the Declaration reflects it.
India chaired BRICS through 2026, convened more than 400 meetings across 30 cities, and secured adoption of a consensus declaration at a summit attended by the leaders of states with sharply divergent positions on West Asia and on the wider security order. The value of that is procedural before it is substantive. A consensus text adopted without recorded objection is an asset for the chair regardless of what it says.
At the same time, India is a G20 member, hosted the G20 in 2023, and announced a framework for an Interim Agreement with the United States on 06/02/2026, in a joint statement whose terms are worth reading precisely. The United States is to apply a reciprocal tariff rate of 18 per cent on originating goods of India under Executive Order 14257 of 02/04/2025 as amended, and, subject to conclusion of the Interim Agreement, to remove the reciprocal tariff on a range of goods including generic pharmaceuticals, gems and diamonds and aircraft parts. India is to eliminate or reduce tariffs on all United States industrial goods and a wide range of food and agricultural products. Both sides commit to address non-tariff barriers and barriers to digital trade, to establish rules of origin, and to negotiate a broader Bilateral Trade Agreement. India intends to purchase USD 500 billion of United States energy products, aircraft and parts, precious metals, technology products and coking coal over five years. The joint statement is a framework; the text of the Interim Agreement itself was not published with it.
One inference follows from putting the two verified documents side by side, and it is an inference rather than a report. The joint statement of 06/02/2026 anchors the 18 per cent rate to Executive Order 14257, a reciprocal tariff order made under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Fourteen days later the Supreme Court held that the same statute does not authorise the President to impose tariffs at all. A bilateral arrangement whose central number rests on a statutory instrument that has since been held not to confer the power is, on its face, an arrangement that needs revisiting. What has happened to it since is outside the two documents and outside this article.
India therefore sits inside the forum that speaks for the Global South and inside the forum that sets the global economic agenda, while negotiating bilaterally with the largest economy in the world. The Declaration is consistent with that position rather than in tension with it. It presses for reform of existing institutions rather than their replacement. It affirms the G20's primacy. It contains no common currency and no bloc-wide trade preference that would cut across bilateral negotiations. It records support for India's aspiration at the United Nations, for India's Chairship of the Kimberley Process, and for India's proposals on insurance risk capability at GIFT City, on the Task Force on Growth and Development, and on the India Centre for BRICS Industrial Competencies.
Specific Indian gains visible on the face of the text include the counter-terrorism paragraph with its express reference to the attack of 22/04/2025; the endorsement of digital public infrastructure as a development model, which is the export of an Indian policy template; the mental health Centres of Excellence network coordinated through NIMHANS; and the recognition of traditional, complementary and integrative medicine as a subject of a dedicated expert working group.
None of this makes the Declaration an Indian document. It makes it a document drafted by an Indian chair who had to keep every member government inside one text. The moderation of the economic language, in our reading, reflects that constraint as much as any policy preference.
VIII. What the Declaration does not do
Candour is more useful than enthusiasm, so it is worth being explicit about the limits.
- It creates no rights. No company can plead it. No court will enforce it. Its paragraphs are not causes of action.
- It contains no dispute settlement. BRICS has no mechanism by which a member can be held to anything in the text.
- It leaves the enforcement gap in trade law untouched. The Declaration asks for restoration of the WTO appellate function; it cannot supply it.
- It creates no currency and no payment system. See section 3.2.
- It is only as strong as consensus. A grouping that decides by consensus and spans states with opposed regional interests will produce carefully balanced language, and balanced language is slow to become binding law.
- Several of its recitals are not independently verified here. Where the Declaration refers to United Nations resolutions, International Court of Justice measures or the outcomes of other bodies, this article reports what the Declaration says. Anyone relying on those references should read the underlying instruments.
IX. Practical checklist
For in-house counsel, trade advisers and compliance teams in any jurisdiction, the following items from this Declaration are worth putting on a watch list now.
- BRICS Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters: Signature and ratification status; scope of information exchange; implications for origin, valuation and classification positions held across member states.
- AEO mutual recognition among BRICS members: A potential commercial advantage for holders, and a competitive disadvantage for non-holders.
- United Nations Convention against Cybercrime: Ratification progress and consequent changes to cross-border electronic evidence requests.
- United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation: Protocol negotiations, and the interaction with existing OECD-led arrangements.
- Intellectual property and artificial intelligence training data: Paragraph 120 as an early indicator of remuneration and licensing obligations in large emerging markets.
- Export MSME credit assessment principles and the Jaipur Consensus invoice discounting study: Trade finance access, and the data protection obligations that follow alternative-data credit scoring.
- Critical minerals: Sovereignty and value-addition language likely to appear in concession and offtake negotiations.
- GIFT City International Financial Services Centre: The proposed BRICS Risk Lab, for insurance and reinsurance participants.
- Carbon border adjustment mechanisms: The Declaration's express opposition is a signal of forthcoming disputes and of pressure inside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and WTO tracks.
- Anti-fraud and intermediary scrutiny: Paragraph 42's reference to misuse of invoicing practices, professional services and cross-border contractual arrangements.
X. Closing
The most accurate description of the New Delhi Declaration is also the least dramatic. It is a long, careful, largely economic consensus text produced by a grouping that has grown faster than its institutions, chaired by a state that is simultaneously a member of the forum it declines to displace. It contains one instrument close to signature, a set of new institutions and networks, a large body of non-binding standards, and a great deal of language that will not become law.
For governments outside the grouping, the useful reading is that the document asks for reform of existing institutions rather than their replacement, and that it says so in terms. For businesses, the useful reading is in tiers A, B and C of the classification in section 5.
For lawyers, the useful reading is the reminder that soft law is not the absence of law but its earliest stage, and that the paragraphs which look dullest today are usually the ones that turn up in a statute five years from now.
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Sources and provisions referred to
Statutes and rules
- United States Constitution: Article I, Section 8
- International Emergency Economic Powers Act (United States)
Treaties and conventions
- Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969: Article 31(3)(b)
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
- United Nations Convention against Corruption
- United Nations Convention against Cybercrime
- United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and its protocols
- Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (not yet concluded)
- Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, and the proposed amendments
- BRICS Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters
Cases
- Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, Supreme Court of the United States, 20/02/2026
- Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., Supreme Court of the United States, 20/02/2026
Official documents
- BRICS New Delhi Declaration, adopted at the eighteenth BRICS Summit, New Delhi, 12/09/2026, including paragraphs 17 to 20, 23 to 41, 43, 47, 85, 90, 97, 98, 99, 107 to 110 and 115
- United States Executive Order 14257 of 02/04/2025, as amended
- India and United States joint statement of 06/02/2026
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701
- Provisional measures of the International Court of Justice in the proceedings instituted by South Africa
- International Monetary Fund: 16th General Review of Quotas and 17th Review
Frequently asked questions
Is the BRICS New Delhi Declaration legally binding?
No. The Declaration adopted at Bharat Mandapam on 12/09/2026 is a consensus political statement, not a treaty. BRICS has no founding charter, no permanent secretariat and no dispute settlement mechanism. The text speaks in the register of we welcome, we encourage, we take note of and we reaffirm, none of which creates a legal obligation. It confers no rights a company can plead and no obligations a court will enforce. Its legal significance lies in what it signals: which instruments are close to signature, which are at committee stage, and which are political language.
Does the Declaration create a BRICS currency or a new payment system?
It does not. Paragraph 90 acknowledges the work of the BRICS Payment Task Force towards exploring pragmatic solutions for cross-border payments, notes study of interoperability between payment and messaging channels, and records discussion of trade settlement in local currencies while expressly reserving national priorities and accepting that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. There is no common currency, no clearing house, no messaging network and no timetable in the text. In legal terms it is a study mandate with an express reservation of national regulatory autonomy.
Which instrument in the Declaration is closest to becoming binding law?
The BRICS Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters, recorded at paragraph 99. The Declaration welcomes convergence on the text and the willingness of members ready to proceed with signing, subject to completion of the necessary national processes. That is ratification vocabulary. If concluded, it would create reciprocal obligations on exchange of information, verification of origin and value, recovery assistance and coordinated enforcement, so a valuation or classification position taken in one member state becomes more easily testable in another.
What does paragraph 120 say about artificial intelligence and intellectual property?
Alongside conventional cooperation among BRICS intellectual property offices on examination, geographical indications and traditional knowledge, paragraph 120 records the importance of collaborating on respect for intellectual property rights in the digital environment, extending that collaboration to rights used for artificial intelligence training purposes as well as fair remuneration to right holders. It also records risks of misappropriation of knowledge and heritage under-represented in data sets and models. Read with paragraph 81, a group of states with very large domestic markets has collectively placed rights-holder remuneration for AI training on the record.
Does the Declaration set BRICS up as a replacement for the G20?
On the face of the text, no. Paragraph 116 describes the G20 as the premier global forum for international economic cooperation, reaffirms a willingness to preserve the legacy of four consecutive presidencies held by BRICS members, and stresses consensus decision making, depoliticised processes and the inadmissibility of arbitrary revision of membership. It underscores South Africa as a founding country and full member. BRICS has expressly conceded primacy in economic cooperation to the wider forum, which keeps the two forums coupled rather than rival.
These answers are educational summaries of the article above; they are not legal advice on any individual matter.
Corrections: if you find an error of law or fact in this article, write to contact@lokeshbhardwajlawoffices.com with the subject 'Correction'. Corrections are made in the text and noted here with the date.
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